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Our analysis of manufacturing plants sampled from India’s major 
industrial centers shows large productivity gaps across cities. The gaps 
partly reflect differences in agglomeration economies and in market 
access. However, they are also explained to a greater extent by differences 
in the degree of labor regulation and in the severity of power shortages. 
This is indication that governments can help narrow regional disparities in 
industrial growth by fostering the “right business environment” in 
locations where industry might otherwise be held back by powerful forces 
of economic geography. There is indeed a pattern in the data whereby 
geographically disadvantaged cities seem to compensate partially for their 
natural disadvantage by having a better business environment than more 
geographically advantaged locations. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 
Sub national regional disparities in industrial development are quite common in large 
economies. They often prompt an important policy question in developing countries -- 
Can governments help narrow regional gaps in industrial productivity by making the 
policy environment of less productive regions more business friendly?
1 Or, would the 
                                                 
* The findings reported in this paper are those of the authors alone, and should not be attributed to the 
World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent. The authors can be contacted at 
slall1@worldbank.org (Lall) and tmengistae@worldbank.org (Mengistae). 
1 We sidestep the question of whether or not this would be the right policy question.  As Rice and Venables 

















































































































d 2  
effects of any feasible reform in a local business environment be swamped by the forces 
of economic geography and path dependence? We address this issue in the context of 
regional gaps in manufacturing performance across India’s states. Having analyzed 
survey data on plants sampled from the 40 main industrial cities in the country, we find 
that economic geography is always a major source of the variations in productivity 
observed across the sample.
 2  However, the local business environment is probably an 
even more powerful influence. Some cities such as Bangalore and Chennai show 
productivity premiums primarily due to their superior geography rather than to a better 
business climate. At the same time business environment explains a greater share of 
productivity premiums or shortfalls than geography for most of the other cities. We 
systematically find that inferior geography appears to be compensated by better business 
environment in a city’s industrial competitiveness. The more geographically advantaged 
is a state or a city, it seems, the more it can afford a “poor” business environment while 
maintaining competitiveness.  
 
A significant source of the effect of geography on plant productivity is 
agglomeration (localization) economies, where business establishments gain productivity 
due to proximity to others in the same line of business. An even larger component is the 
effect of market access, defined as a proximity-weighted average of purchasing power or 
economic activity in potential trading partners of a location. For example, the city of New 
Delhi has a total factor productivity premium of 26 % in garments production over the 
city of Bhopal in the state of Madhya Pradesh on account of its economic geography.  
However, only 4 percentage points of this premium comes from greater localization 
economies. The balance of the (geographic) productivity premium reflects better access 
to markets for garments producers in Delhi. Similarly, the average garment producer in 
Mumbai has a 22 percentage point productivity advantage over the average producer in 
New Delhi for geographic reasons. Of this about 3 percentage points are due to 
                                                                                                                                                 
inevitably mean that their removal would improve social welfare. However, there are circumstances where 
reducing regional inequality is both feasible and produces welfare gains.  
2The forty cities are distributed across 12 of India’s 16 major states, including the most industrially 
advanced alongside those where the manufacturing sector is the least developed. Each of the 12 states is 
represented by the top 3 or 4 industrial cities in it.  
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Mumbai’s greater localization economies, and the remaining 19 points due to its greater 
market access.  
 
The productivity gap between Mumbai and Delhi underscores the importance of 
the distinction between the domestic and foreign components of market access. For a 
large economy like India domestic market access is probably the more important 
component for most firms. Not surprisingly, however, foreign market access explains a 
greater proportion of the geographic productivity premium of port cities than domestic 
access. Indeed, compared to Delhi, the cities of Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata all have 
smaller domestic market access. The fist two of these have an overall positive 
productivity premium over Delhi in part because their smaller domestic market access is 
more than compensated for by their greater foreign market access.   
 
While the combined effect of geographic factors on productivity is quite 
significant, it is often smaller than the influence of two key elements of the business 
environment. These are (1) the degree to which labor is regulated and (2) the quality of 
power supply from the public grid, both of which are measured at the plant level. We 
measure labor regulation by whether or not the plant’s management considered it to be a 
major or severe obstacle to the operations or growth of the plant at the time of the survey.  
We measure the quality of power supply by managements’ estimate of the plant’s output 
loss due to power outages in the year leading up to the survey.  
 
These two indicators of the business environment explain a larger proportion of 
the productivity premium or shortfall than differences in market access or agglomeration 
economies.  In some cities, such as Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh or Ahmedabad in Gujarat, 
power shortages are costlier than intrusive labor regulations. The opposite is true for 
Noida in Uttar Pradesh and Gurgaon in Haryana. However, in general, labor regulation 
and power shortages vary in the same direction, in contrast to the seeming opposition 
between the directions of movement of business environment as a whole and geography.  
We also conclude that both aspects of the business environment are equally important 
across the 40 cities.  
  4  
An obvious policy implication of these findings is that government policies that 
we refer collectively as the business environment have a strong bearing on the spatial 
distribution of economic activities. We use the term business environment as just another 
name for what Dollar et al (2004) call investment climate. We define it as something 
broadly synonymous with institutions in the growth literature (Knack and Keefer 1995), 
or with what Hall and Jones (2000) call social infrastructure.
3 
 
Our focus on only two items of a possibly long list of elements of business 
environment is dictated by the prominence that labor deregulation and problems of the 
power sector have in the current policy reform literature in India. At the same time they 
seem to be relatively easy to measure, and show significant variation across sub national 
regions.
4 Our broader result that differences in business environment are a major source 
of regional gaps in productivity is consistent with Dollar et al (2004) who report similar 
findings for international gaps in manufacturing productivity based on the World Bank’s 
Investment Climate Surveys and the same methodology.
5 Our findings on labor 
regulation are consistent with a recent paper by Besley and Burgess (2004), which also 
shows that regional differences in labor regulation are part of the reason why some of 
India’s states have lagged behind others in industrial development.
6 This finding is 
confirmed by Aghion et al (2004) with data disaggregated to the three-digit ISIC level 
                                                 
3 Accordingly we would include under it government activities relating to  regulation of trade and industry 
and the  provision of public goods that affect the cost or scale of production at the firm level by influencing 
factor productivity, prices or both.  Apart from labor market regulations, pertinent regulatory activities  
include those aimed at financial markets/institutions, environmental externalities and zoning, industrial 
licensing, bankruptcy laws, the regulation of utilities including power, telecom or transport companies, law 
and contract enforcement institutions, customs regulation, and domestic and foreign trade taxes. 
4 Many other aspects are either far more difficult to observe (e.g. the quality of law or contract enforcement 
institutions), or do not seem to vary a great deal sub nationally (e.g. industrial licensing and the regulation 
of financial markets). Besley and Burgess (2004) make the latter point with respect to labor regulation. 
5 Our finding of association between business environment and spatial productivity gaps is also consistent 
with Escribano and Guasch (2004), Latin American data, Eifert et al (2005) for a number of African 
economies, and Haltiwanger and Schweiger (2005) on a much larger set of developing economies. Each of 
these papers analyzes international productivity gaps based on the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys 
but from perspectives slightly different from Dollar et al (2004). Dollar et al (2002) and Hallward-
Driemeier et al (2003) link in country variation in productivity to business environment using the World 
Bank survey data for India and China respectively. 
6 Based on an analysis of time series of aggregate (state level) data, Besley and Burgess conclude that labor 
law reforms that some states carried out over the period 1958-1992 to reduce compliance costs led to faster 
growth in manufacturing employment and productivity than in states that, either did not amend the labor 
law at all, or did so, but in ways that increased the cost of regulation to businesses.  5  
and covering more recent years. It also concurs with a World Bank report on India 
(World Bank, 2002), which, in addition to labor regulation, identifies power shortages as 
a factor in economic performance gaps across states. 
7  
 
There are two important methodological differences between the analysis of the 
role of labor regulation presented in this paper and that of Besley and Burgess (2004). 
First, Besley and Burgess (2004) measure labor regulation in terms of a state level labor 
dispute law index registering “pro-employer” or “pro-worker” reforms over the 34 year 
period covered by their study.
8  A possible drawback in using legislative events to 
measure the degree of labor regulation is that it would entail suppressing possible 
differences across locations and regions in the implementation or enforcement of the 
same laws. It is also possible that firms respond differentially to the same enforcement 
effort due to differences in the nature and magnitude of other binding constraints. One 
way to minimize the bias in the estimation of local effects of labor regulation would seem 
be to measure it in terms of each firm’s evaluation of how far its choices are constrained 
by labor laws and regulation.   
 
The second, and more important, methodological difference between Besley and 
Burgess (2004) and our analysis is that we estimate the short run effects of business 
environment on productivity, while their analysis is of a long run nature. Our data are 
such that we observe the business environment in a cross section of plants over a certain 
year, but along side inputs and output for the same year plus the previous two years 
leading up to it.  In the analysis we assume that that the business climate indicators 
observed at the time of the survey also characterize a plant’s environment over the 
preceding two years. This enables us to use the longitudinal observations in productivity 
                                                 
7 Dollar et al (2002) also provide some evidence that differences in power shortages help to explain some 
of the observed regional gaps in manufacturing productivity across states. 
 
8 They find that states that used their labor legislative prerogatives to introduce pro-employer amendments 
to India’s federal Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, had better economic performance over the period in 
terms of growth as well as productivity. In contrast, states that reformed the act in a “pro-worker “ direction 
registered lower growth and lower productivity. Aghion et al (2004) also use the Besley –Burgess index in 
their analysis of inter-state gaps in industrial productivity and growth at the three-digit Standards of 
Industrial Classification Code level, basically to confirm the Besley-Burgess finding on the role of labor 
regulation.  6  
to control for the technological heterogeneity of firms (as they respond to purely cross-
sectional variation in business environment). The relationship between business 
environment and productivity that we  map out in this way is a short run effect as it is 
conditioned on the current (or observed) spatial distribution of plants.  
 
Profit maximizing firms would tolerate regional gaps in business environment as 
long as these are compensated by  mobility or relocation costs, or by other sources of 
productivity in the current location-notably, natural geography, market access and 
agglomeration economies. In other words, if any two locations differed only with respect 
to business environment (and there were no mobility costs), all plants would eventually 
have (re)located away from regions of poorer business environment. This means that 
there would always be a “reallocation of plants” between cities and regions over any 
period of time in response to persistence differences in business environment.
9 The 
estimates of the effect of business environment on local or regional industrial 
productivity we report here are short run effects as they omit (the productivity effects) of 
the spatial reallocation of activities.  
 
On the other hand, being based on longitudinal analyses of aggregate  (state level) 
data,  the productivity gaps that Besley and Burgess (2004)  attribute to differences in 
business environment are of a long run nature as they include spatial reallocation effects 
(as well as the short run effects). There is, however, the downside to the use of aggregate 
data in this context in that we cannot separately identify short run effects from aggregate 
data.  We think that such identification is important because firms base their location 
choices and investment decisions on short-run productivity premiums or shortfalls, rather 
than on their long-run counterparts. . We also believe that the only practical way we can 
achieve this identification is probably estimating the effects of business environment at 
the plant level. At the same time, it is the long run productivity effects that would 
measure the true cost of possible deficiencies in a location’s business environment. 
Moreover, longitudinal analysis of aggregate or industry level data seems to be a far 
                                                 
9 This is not, of course, necessarily in the sense of the physical dismantling of plants to set them up 
elsewhere, but in that the number of plants in areas of “poor” business environment would eventually fall 
through closures relative to areas of  relatively “good” environment, where more new plants would be setup 
than would be closed over the same period.  7  
easier way for getting at this true cost than aggregating up from plant level estimates.
10 
We therefore would like to think of our (plant-level) approach to the analysis of the 
effects of business environment as a natural complement, rather than alternative,  to 
aggregate analyses at the industry or sector level. 
 
One advantage of estimating productivity effects of business environment at the 
level of the plant rather than the industry is that it enables us to identify these along side  
the effects of geographic variables.  Simultaneous identification of the effects of 
institutions and economic geography would seem to be more and more difficult as we 
work at higher and higher levels of aggregation. It would indeed be impossible in cases 
where the identification of the effects of business environment has to rely on (individual) 
fixed effect techniques in which the effects of economic geography would have to be  
“differenced  out”.  
 
  On the other hand, as Dollar et al (2004) point out, plant level analysis of the 
productivity effects of the business environment needs to address econometric problems 
that would not arise in the analysis of longitudinal aggregate data. One of these is the 
possibility of selectivity bias in least squares estimates of the effect of business 
environment on productivity arising from the correlation of unobservable location or firm 
characteristics influencing plant productivity with those affecting location decisions. 
There is  also the possibility that the firm level incidence of  business environmental 
bottlenecks could be endogenous even in the absence of selectivity, say, because 
inherently more productive firms somehow cope better with adversity in their external 
environment.
11  
                                                 
10 Long run effects can be identified along side short run effects based on plant level analysis.  However, 
this requires longitudinal census data. Even then it is difficult to imagine an easier way of identifying long 
run effects as defined here than aggregating estimation at least at the industry level. The reason for this is 
that most competitive industries seem to be subject to simultaneous entry and exit, for which the spatial 
analogue would seem to be that new plants are observed to open in a local economy at the same time as 
others shutdown in the same line of business. Isolating the long run effects while keeping the analysis at the 
plant level then would mean  identifying the effects of business environment on the productivity of the 
typical new entry and on that of the typical  closing plant.  
 
11 This second form of endogeneity is also discussed in Dollar et al (2004) and has  to be addressed in 
analysis based on industry aggregates as well  
  8  
 
We have organized the rest of our paper as follows. Section 2 describes our data.  Section 
3 discusses econometric issues. We present estimation results in Section 4. Section 5 is 





II.         Data sources and measurement 
 
 
Our data come primarily from the World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey of India for 
the year 2003.
12 The survey covered 1856 manufacturing establishments sampled from 40 
cities, which are the top 3 or 4 cities of the largest industrial concentration from each of 
12 of India’s 15 largest states.  These 12 states are Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Haryana, Maharashtra,  Madhya  Pradesh, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Uttar 
Pradesh,  and West Bengal. Between them the 12 states account for well over 90 percent 
of India’s industrial GDP.  The 3 or 4 cities covered in each state also accounted for the 
bulk of manufacturing outputs of their respective states. In each city, samples were drawn 
exclusively from the main exporting or import competing manufacturing industries: food, 
textiles, garments, leather goods, drugs and pharmaceuticals, chemical, consumer 
electronics, electrical white goods, auto parts, fabricated metals, and machinery.  
 
Table 1 draws up the business profile of establishments in the sample in terms of 
scale, age, start up conditions and productivity. The average plant has just over a hundred 
workers over the full sample, but with significant variation in scale across sectors, 
ranging from average employment size of under forty in consumer electronics to more 
than 250 in textiles. We are thus dealing with what is essentially a population of small to 
medium sized establishments, although the sample does include  a sizeable number of 
large scale plants. The vast majority of the full sample are also owner managed, most 
                                                 
12 However, we use these in conjunction with similar World Bank Surveys for other developing economies 
for the purpose of estimating the reference technology in terms of which the productivity indices we relate 
to business environment and geographic variables in the paper have been calculated. We also draw on other 
(secondary) sources including the Annual Survey of Industries of the Central Statistical Office of India for 
data on indicators of economic geography.  9  
having been established by the current owner. Some 83 % of managers cited the desire to 
operate in one’s state of birth was one of the major reasons for the choice of the current 
plant location. 
 
Depending on its line of business, the typical plant would have been in operation 
at the time of the survey for between 12 years (leather goods) and 34 years (fabricated 
metals). During this interval it would have grown to several times of its start up size in 
terms of employment-ranging from just under twice the initial size in  textiles to more 
than four times in drugs and pharmaceuticals. In spite of the seemingly high average age  
there seems to have been substantial  turnover in the population from which our sample 
has been drawn.  An indication of this is that  a quarter of the full sample and nearly a 
third of those in the garments industry have been in business only for five years or less.  
 
 
Plant capital intensity in terms of the book value of equipment per worker ranges 
from a little over US $ 2000 in fabricated metals to about US $ 5600 in the drugs and 
pharmaceuticals industry. This corresponds to a range in annual value added per worker 
from US $ 2737  in fabricated metals, to US$ 7492 in drugs and pharmaceuticals.
13   We 
define value added per worker as annual sales revenue less the cost of materials and 
energy. The average worker earned US $ 1087 over the full sample at the average official 
exchange rate of the rupee for 1999, but this also varied considerably by industry from 
lows of under US $ 800 in the leather goods industry and in fabricated metals to a high of 
US $ 1578 in machine tools.  
 
 
 (a)   Business environment indices: labor regulation 
 
The World Bank Investment Climate Survey data on India includes observations 
on a wide range of indicators on what we refer here as the business environment. These 
indicators can be classified into four broad groups: a) macro-economic stabilization; b) 
quality of governance including the performance of law and contract enforcement 
institutions; c) regulation of trade, industry, and factor markets; and d) quality of physical 
                                                 
13 All monetary figures relating to the survey are expressed in US dollars at the annual average official 
exchange rate of the Indian rupee for year 1999.  10 
infrastructure, including power supply, postal and telecommunication, and transport. The 
consensus seems to be that there is no significant difference in terms of macroeconomic 
stability or the quality of law and contract enforcement institutions across states in India. 
On the other hand differences  in business regulation and the quality of infrastructure 
have often been invoked as part of the reason why industry has not developed as much in 
some states as in others.  
 
Within the category of business regulation, the regulation of foreign trade and 
customs administration come under the purview of the federal government and do not 
consequently vary between states.  As Besley and Burgess (2004) point out, there is no 
difference between states in the regulation of entry and exit through licensing 
requirements or bankruptcy laws. This is not the case with labor regulation, which is 
generally believed to be more stringent in India than in most other comparable 
economies. Critics of the current state of labor regulation in India as a whole point out 
that it has unduly raised exit barriers in Indian industry and constitutes one of the major 
drags on its international competitiveness.
14  The link between industrial exit barriers and 
labor regulation stems from the employment security provisions of the Industrial 
Disputes Act of 1947.  This act sets out the rules for settlement of employment 
termination disputes. One of its main provisions requires establishments employing more 
than 100 workers to seek the permission of the state government for closure or the 
retrenchment of workers, which permission, critics point out, is rarely granted (Sachs et 
al, 1999). This is believed to have added significantly to duration of insolvency 
procedures in the country.  
 
This provision of the Industrial disputes act is also criticized for having combined 
with other related labor laws to preclude the exploitation of economies of scale in many 
industries by reducing the flexibility that firms would need to adjust factor proportions to 
changes in product or factor market conditions. Related labor laws include the ‘service-
rules’ provisions of the Industrial Employment Act of 1946 and the provisions of the 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Sachs, Vashney and Bajpai (1999), who blame labor market rigidity not only for 
keeping down the growth rate of exports low, but also for the “shockingly low” share of formal sector 
employment in India’s economy. The authors calculate that only 8.5 percent of India’s labor force or 27 
million people are in formal sector employment of which 70 percent work for government agencies.  11 
Contract Labor (Abolition and Regulation) Act of 1970. The Industrial Employment Act 
provides for the definition of job content, employee status and area of work by state law 
or by collective agreement, after which changes would not be made without getting the 
consent of all workers.
15  Zagha (1999) points out that this has always made it difficult 
for businesses ‘to shift workers not only between plants and locations, but also between 
different jobs in the same plant.’ As a way out of such restrictions businesses may resort 
to contract workers, as per the provision of yet another law, namely, the Contract Labor 
Act. This law gives state governments the right to abolish contract labor in any industry 
in any part of the state.  In states where recourse to contract labor has been more 
restricted as a result, keeping employment below the threshold level of 100 employees or 
contracting out jobs has been the only way of maintaining flexibility in the allocation of 
manpower. 
 
Although labor law in India is primarily federal in origin, ample room has been 
provided for variation across states in effective restriction on labor market transactions by 
the fact that states have always been responsible for the enforcement of the same laws. 
They also have the power to amend some of them substantially. Based on the extent to 
which states have actually used this power for subsidiary legislation since the late 1950’s, 
Besley and Burgess (2004) have classified states into categories reflecting restrictiveness 
of labor regulation.  Their analysis of shows that states that amended laws in a “pro-
labor” direction experienced slower growth on the average while those that changed laws 
in favor of employers grew significantly faster.  In this paper we assess the link between 
industrial productivity and a plant-level indicator of the restrictiveness labor regulation 
which enables us to control for a potential gap between legislation and enforcement. The 
indicator we use is the plant manager’s response to the World Bank Investment Climate 
Survey question on whether or not managers considered labor regulation to be a major or 
severe obstacle to the operations or growth of their businesses. As can be seen from Table 
2, there is sharp contrast in responses across states. While between one-third and 70 per 
cent of managers consider labor regulation as a major to severe obstacle in states such as 
                                                 
15 This too applies for establishments with more than 100 employees, but Zagha (1999) notes that some 
states have made the provisions mandatory to firms with 50 or more workers while other states have 
abolished the employment size limit altogether.  12 
Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Delhi, labor laws do not seem to draw significant complaint 
in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Punjab.  
 
 (b) Business environment indicators: power shortages 
 
Disparities in power supply and transport are often cited as sources of regional 
gaps in economic performance in India. Regional differences in road and rail transport 
networks cannot be identified separately from other components of market access and 
should be treated accordingly as influences on productivity. When we turn to power 
supply the basic problem in India at the moment is one of shortage, high costs and 
unreliability, all reportedly stemming more from problems of transmission and 
distribution than of generation. There are several indicators in the World Bank 
Investment Climate Survey in terms of which regional differences in the gravity of the 
problem could be described. One of these is the frequency of outages reported by 
managers. According to the survey, power outrages occur almost every other day for the 
average business in India, as compared to once every two weeks in China, and once a 
week in Brazil.  A more accurate indicator from the point of industrial productivity seems 
to be, however, the output that managers estimate to lose on account of the outages.  This 
is the indicator we use in estimating the productivity equation in the next section. 
According to World Bank surveys, the average manufacturer in India reports losing 8.4 
percent a year in sales as opposed to under 2 percent for the average manufacturer in 
China or Brazil. Outages could lead to loss of sales by forcing downtime (or idle 
capacity) on managers. They could also cause wastage of material that would have been 
in-process at the point of the outage and could not be used when production subsequently 
resumes. Then there could be the additional cost of equipment maintenance costs directly 
attributable to physical damages done by outages. Regional variation in reported losses 
due to outages within India are shown in the first column of Table 2, losses ranging from 
under 4 percent in the state of Gujarat to more than 15 per cent in the state of Uttar 
Pradesh. 
 
Many view the problem of power shortages in India as one of regulatory policy 
and ownership in the energy sector. At the root of the current supply shortage to industry  13 
seems to be that there has been serious under-investment in transmission and distribution 
infrastructure over a very long time. This in turn is often linked to power generation and 
distribution having been a monopoly or near-monopoly of government owned enterprises 
operating under State Electricity Boards (SEBs). For a long time now, many SEBs have 
followed a deliberate policy of under pricing of electricity to households and farms, only 
part of which they have managed to pass on to industry through tariffs at above cost and 
international rates.  This and the boards’ growing failure to protect transmission and 
collect bills, has led to large financial shortfalls in relation to the needs of investment in 
maintenance and additional capacity. Recent efforts at attracting private investment as a 
solution include the opening up of generation and distribution to private capital and the 
unbundling of SEB’s into independent commercial agencies specializing in generation, 
transmission or distribution only.  In most states, these efforts have yet to bear fruit partly 
because of the reported absence of a regulatory framework in which potential investors 
have confidence.  
  
(c) Indices of economic geography 
 
Research in ‘New Economic Geography’ identifies market access and agglomeration 
economies as the two most important aspects of location specific attributes that influence 
cross country and sub national regional gaps in productivity (Krugman 1992; Fujita, 
Krugman, and Venables 1999). The purpose of introducing these variables is to examine 
if the benefits from agglomeration set into place a process of path dependence in terms of 
industrialization, and whether government policy reforms that improve the local business 
environment of industrially less advanced regions can counter agglomeration economies 
and influence the distribution of economic activities in a reasonably short time frame. Are 
low levels of industrial performance in some states and cities determined only by poor 
access to markets and lack of sufficient agglomeration economies? Or can geographically 
disadvantaged regions compensate their inherent deficiencies by improving their business 
environment to surpass those of industrially advanced regions? 
 
Agglomeration economies are based on the technological externalities that may 
arise when a relatively large number of firms locate in proximity to one another.  14 
Although these economies are external to the firm they are internal to the industries in 
question. They can therefore be thought of as scale economies at the level of the industry. 
Externalities could arise from firms sharing a pool of sector specific skills, sharing 
physical or institutional infrastructure for collective action or for efficient subcontracting. 
There is a body of evidence showing positive externalities arising from such sources. See, 
for example, Ciccone and Hall (1996) , and Henderson et al (1999). However, industrial 
concentration could lead to offsetting congestion costs by bidding up wage rates and land 
prices or the overcrowding transport facilities and other forms of physical infrastructure. 
We measure agglomeration or localization economies as the net effect of (three digit 
ISIC) own industry aggregate local employment on plant level productivity. Table 2 
shows that, on this measure, the states of Gujarat, Delhi, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu 
would be at a clear advantage over states such as Kerala, Madhya Pradesh and West 
Bengal. 
 
Market access is the proximity weighted  aggregate size of the potential markets 
of a business or a local economy.  It is sometimes divided into domestic and foreign 
components in the literature.  For lack of a better alternative, we use as a proxy the 
foreign market access of a city the inverse of its distance from the nearest major port. Not 
surprisingly, the states that register greater agglomeration economies also have greater 
foreign market access on this measure. These are the states of Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, 
and Gujarat. The only state that is in the top quartet in terms of agglomeration economies 
but does not have high foreign market access is Delhi. However, it happens to 
compensate for this through its greater domestic market access, which we measure using 
an index developed in Lall et al (2004). This is based on a gravity model whereby the 
market access of a location is a weighted average of the purchasing power of all other 
locations within India as potential trading partners, with the inverse of average travel time 




                                                 
16 Details of the market access index of Lall et al (2004) are given in Appendix A.  15 
Besides Delhi other states that have relatively high domestic market access are 
(Table 2) Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. With the exception of 
Tamil Nadu their advantage in domestic market access  is countered by their 
disadvantage in terms of foreign market access, so much so that only Tamil Nadu in this 
group counts among the top four in terms of agglomeration economies.    
 
(d) Measuring productivity 
 
As already indicated we measure businesses performance in terms of productivity as we 
investigate the role of business environment and the economic geography of business 
location in its determination.
17 Table 2 shows large productivity gaps between sub 
samples drawn from the 12 states. This is in the sense that value added per worker is, for 
example, 38% higher in the Karnataka sub sample than it is in the overall sample, but 
22% lower in the sample from Madhya Pradesh than it is in the full sample. However, it 
is also clear from the same table that these gaps reflect differences in  the capital or skill 
intensity of production or  in product market structure.  The regional gap in fixed assets 
per employee that we read from the table is indeed more pronounced than that which seen 
in value added per worker. There are also large gaps in the average wage rate which is 
likely to partly reflect cost-of-living differences across locations, but could also originate 
from genuine regional gaps in skills. However, we want to focus on  the effects both 
factors would have independently of their influences on relative factor prices, that is, on 
their effect on total factor productivity.   
         
Total factor productivity (TFP) is the amount by which the actual output of a plant 
exceeds or falls short of a counterfactual on a reference technology.
 18  We define 
                                                 
17 One reason for this choice is that a “levels” performance indicator is easier to conceptually link to cross 
sectional variations in one shot observations of levels of indicators of business environment or of 
geography than business growth or business investment. Among possible “levels” indicators technical 
efficiency or productivity is the more conventional measure in a context such as ours and given our data -
rather than profitability-for example, partly because it is easier to measure and partly because it is easier to 
link to social welfare or to national economic performance. 
 
18The reference technology here is the average or representative production function of the population of 
interest.  In an alternative approach the reference technology is a the frontier production function in which  16 
separate reference technologies for each of the 11 three-digit (ISIC) industries in our data 
each of which we assume to be Cobb-Douglas in labor and capital inputs. We also 
assume that within each industry the production function is the same for all producers up 
to a Hicks neutral productivity shift term,  it A ,  capturing total factor productivity. Let  it Q  
be the net output of producer i in year t,   it it PQ R ≡  the corresponding revenue from 
sales, P  is the price output,   it L  the labor input to  its production, and  it K  the capital 
stock tied up with the production process over the year. To calculate TFP we estimate the 










it it E L K A R







J =  is the revenue share of factor  J  ,  J P  is the price of  J , and 
R
it E  is an 
error term. If we assume that all firms have the same degree of product market power 
expressed in a constant price cost margin, µ, (log) total factor productivity would be 
given by  
 






it l s k s A A + − − = µ  
 
However, in the absence of knowledge of µ we observe only 
R
it A ln  and not  it A ln . 
It is therefore 
R
it A ln  that we directly relate to business environment and economic 
geography in the rest of the paper. This would be the same as relating  it A ln  to the same 
factors as long as we control for the difference between the two indices. This we propose 








                                                                                                                                                 
case productivity would be decreases monotonically with   technical inefficiency, which is the amount by 
which it falls short of a maximum defined by the frontier given the input mix.  
19  See Griffith (2002) for a more detailed discussion of the problem adjusting productivity estimates for 
market power  in a context similar to ours.  17 
To obtain the index 
R
it A ln  itself we estimated  (a log transformation of ) equation (1) for 
each of the industries covered by the India sample, but on observations pooled from 
World Bank Investment Climate Survey data for seven countries including India.
20 
Details of the estimates are given in Table 3. The first two columns of the table present 
OLS estimates which are, however, bound to biased. The reason is that TFP term, 
R
it a , is 
a state variable that  influences the choice of inputs. As a result it must be correlated with 
all other right hand side variable of the equation. There are at least three recent 
techniques of achieving identification in this setting. These are Olley and Pakes (1996), 
Blundell and Bond (2000), and Levinshon and Petrin (2003). We have used the 
Levinshon-Petrin estimator because of the relative ease of its application given our data. 
We have too few observations on investment to use the Olley-Pakes estimator, and our 




In the estimation of production functions labor input is often measured as the number of 
employees,  it N , of the producer. This, however, would entail ignoring the possible 
heterogeneity of the workforce in terms of both of skills and effort. One way of avoiding 
this is to take into account differences in labor productivity between producers by using 
the average plant-level wage rate,  it w ,  as a conversion or weight factor to define labor 
input as the wage bill at constant prices, that is, to set  it it it N w L = .  
 
III.    Econometric issues  
 
Let us assume, for a moment, that the population of manufacturing establishments in the 
40 cities and  the 11 industries  from which our sample is drawn is all we care about 
when we model the relationship between establishment level productivity, 
R
ijt A ˆ ln , on the 
one hand, and business environment,  , ijt x  and economic geography,  ijt g , on the other, 
                                                 
20 The countries are Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Honduras, India, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Peru. 
The only criteria for the selection of countries was the availability of data on the industries of interest. The 
ideas was to form as large a sample size as possible on which to base the estimation of each industry’s 
average production function. 
21 See Appendix B for a description of  the Levinshon-Petrin estimator.  18 
where j  indexes locations (or cities). To simplify notation we will treat both  x and g , as 
scalars, although we actually estimate coefficients of  two indicators of business 
environment and three variables of economic geography. To these we add three error 
components of
R
it A ln , two of which we assume to be time invariant. Let one of these, i θ , 
summarize the effect of unobservable establishment characteristics on productivity. Let 
the second,  j µ , be the effect of unobservable location characteristics on the same. The 
third,  it ε  , is a zero mean, iid, random shocks uncorrelated with the other two and the 
indicators of geography and business environment. Assume also that the relationship 
between 
R A ln and all of its determinants is linear such that  
 
(3)   ijt j i ijt ijt ijt
R
ijt z g x A ε µ θ δ γ β α + + + + + + = ˆ ln  ,  
 
where  N i ,.., 1 = ,  J j ,..., 1 = ;  T t ,..., 1 = ;  , ,β α   γ  are constants, and  z is a set of 
observed firm or establishment characteristics. We observe 
R A ln and z annually for the 
three year period 2001-2003 so that  . 3 = T We also observe  ijt x  only for the last of these 
three years, while our observation of  ijt g  are obtained from sources other than the World 
Bank survey and relate to the 1990s. However, we assume that x has been constant for 
each firm over the three-year period of interest and that g would not have changed 
significantly since the late 1990s. In other words, we assume  ij ijt x x =  and  ij ijt g g =  so 
that we can re-write (3) as  
 
(4)   ijt j i ijt ij ij
R
ijt z g x A ε µ θ δ γ β α + + + + + + = ˆ ln  
   
Assuming further that both  ij g  and  ijt z  are exogenous to
R
ijt A ˆ ln , (4) can be estimated as a 
random effects model consistently by GLS provided that  ij x  is also uncorrelated with  i θ  
and  j µ , or we can fully control for both of the latter variables. Since we have defined 
location at the fairly aggregate level of the city we can, in principle, control for location  19 
fixed effects,  j µ ,  more or less fully. Unfortunately, we cannot say the same about 
controlling plant fixed effects.  Given that we observe business environment and 
economic geography only in cross section, we cannot fully control for  i θ  by differencing 
it out or by including establishment dummies. Yet it is not difficult to imagine scenarios 
where both indicators of business environment are correlated with it. It is possible, for 
example, that labor laws are more likely to impose binding constraints on inherently more 
productivity establishments, which consequently rate labor regulation as a major or 
severe obstacle to their growth. One reason for this could be these firms have access to 
more “advanced” technology that they could exploit better if the laws were different. On 
the other hand, inherently less productive firms, though facing the same laws would not 
be constrained by them not even being aware of alternative  technology. Similarly, 
inherently more productive firms may better cope with frequent power outages through 
the use of more flexible processes and production schedules. They could consequently 
lose less in potential output than less efficient firms.  We propose to correct the bias that a 
scenarios like these would introduce to GLS estimates of (4) by replacing  ij x  by the 
corresponding city average,  j x  to estimate, instead, 
 
(5)  ijt j i ijt j j
R
ijt z g x A ε µ θ δ γ β α + + + + + + = ˆ ln . 
 
The underlying idea is that while each firm might influence the incidence of bottlenecks 
in its business environment, it has no control on how the average plant in its city would 
fare in those terms. As Dow et al (2003) note applying GLS to (5) is equivalent to the 
estimation of (7) by two stage least squares instrumental variable method whereby  ij x  is 




ij j ij D x ν λ λ + + = ∑ 0  
  20 
where  ij D ’s are city dummies,  j λ ’s are  constants,  and  ij ν  is a zero-mean, iid, random 
error term uncorrelated with ij D ’s.  Only that this interpretation would not apply here 
since we have to include  ij D ’s in the productivity regression in order to fully control for 
the unobserved location fixed effects  j µ . The latter is generally correlated with  j x  and 
failure to control for it would render GLS estimates of parameters of (5) inconsistent. 
What we should estimate rather is therefore the equation 
 
(7)  ijt i
j
ij j ijt j j
R
ijt D z g x A υ θ φ δ γ β α + + + + + + = ∑ ) ( ˆ ln  
 
where  j φ  is a constant and  ijt υ  is a zero mean i.i.d error term orthogonal to all the other 
right hand side variables. Provided that  i θ  is uncorrelated with  ij D  (or with  ijt z ) ,  this  
can be estimated consistently as a random effects model by generalized least squares.
22  
However, while we can always limit our firm level controls to variables that are 
exogenous,   i θ    would be uncorrelated with  ij D  -and hence with  j x  and  j g  , only if its 
mean is constant across locations (or cities).  It is more likely, though, that  i θ  includes 
firm characteristics that also happen to influence plant location decisions.  It is quite 
possible, for example, that inherently more productive plants  are more likely to be found 
where the business environment is better, just as it is possible that more efficient firms 
tend to locate in geographically advantaged areas. Alternatively, the inherently more 
efficient could tolerate more inhospitable business environments or more adverse 
geography.  In that case GLS parameter estimate of (7) would be subject to selectivity 
bias in spite of the fact that we would have fully controlled for unobserved location fixed 
effects.  
 
We propose to avoid this bias by modeling productivity along with plant location 
decisions so that equation (7) is only the first of a two-equation simultaneous system that 
also includes a selection equation.  In specifying the other equation, we assume that the 
                                                 
22  This point is also made in Dow et al (2003) in a slightly different context  21 
location of each plant i has been chosen from a set of alternatives so as to maximize 
expected profits. Thus if plant i is located in  city  j , where expected profits are  ij Π , 
then  ik ij Π > Π  for all  j k ≠ , where  ik Π  is the profits the firm of i would have expect to 
earn over the life time of an alternative plant in location k   J k j ,..., 1 , = .  As arguments 
of the profit function, wage rates and the cost of capital should depend on the very 
variables of economic geography and business environment included in equation (7). In 
addition, we assume that factor prices and location  depend on unobservable factors the 
effect of which (on expected profits) we subsume under a location specific (time 
invariant) error term.  
 
Our identifying assumption is that the magnitude of these location fixed effects in 
profits varies by firm type. In particular, we assume that, other things being equal, the 
cost of credit varies by firm type, being higher, on the average for firms that are smaller, 
younger, or run by newly migrant entrepreneurs. This seems to be a reasonable 
assumption in view of the fact that the vast majority of establishments in the sample are 
small to medium sized owner-managed businesses. There is considerable anecdotal and 
formal evidence that small businesses or new startups are rationed out of formal credit 
markets
23There is also survey evidence that managers of such businesses put a premium 
on locating their businesses in their home towns or birth states, for which one possible 
reason seems to be access to credit or commercial networks. Business startup size, 
business age and the location of birth of entrepreneurs thus appear to be legitimate 
arguments of the reduced form expected profit function of new start ups or businesses 
contemplating a range of prospective plant locations to choose from.  Of these three only 
business age cannot be excluded from the productivity equation justifiably.  There is 
some evidence that the technical efficiency of plants depends on age for a variety of 
                                                 
23 For example, Bigsten et al (2003) report that smaller or younger firms are less likely to get bank loans for 
a given level of demand for credit in a sample of firms dawn from six African countries. Levenson and 
Willard (2000) report that only about 6% of US businesses are rationed out of formal credit markets, but 
these are all small and young firms. Blanchflower, Levine and Zimmerman (1998) report that ethnic 
minorities are less likely to obtain formal sector loans other things being equal, and when they do typically 
face higher interest charges. The theory of rationing of credit (on non-price criteria) has been well 
established  since Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), its  theme being that asymmetry of information between 
borrows and lenders about the risk and expected profit of projects forces lenders to resort to non price 
screening criteria to prevent adverse selection.  22 
reasons. On the other hand, there does not seem to be any reason to suppose that 
productivity would depend on start up size once we net out scale effects, or on the 
location of birth of the entrepreneur except through the scale effect that this might  have 
in as far as it could influence on access to credit.  
 
Suppose the expected profit function can be reasonably approximated by a linear 
specification such that 
 
(8)        ij j i j j ij d cg x b a η ξ + + + + = Π  
 
where, a, b , and care constants;  j ξ  is a location fixed effect,  ij η  is an iid error term 
uncorrelated with observables and  j ξ ; and 
 
 (9)      1
'
0 δ δ i i W d + =  
 
where  0 δ  is a constant,   1 δ  is a vector constants, and  i W  is a vector of observable 
establishment characteristics including start up size, age and whether or not the business 
owner was born in  j .  The parameters of the profit function (8) are identified in relation 
to those of equation (7) by the exclusion of startup size and whether or not the 
entrepreneur was born in  j  from equation (7).
 24  
 
As is the common practice in the econometric literature on business location choice we 
assume that the error term  ij η  has Gumbel distribution. This specifies our plant location 
model as conditional logit, whereby  the probability that location  j  is chosen for plant i 
is given by 
 
                                                 
24 Identification is possible without recourse to the exclusion of start up size and birth status of managers 
from the productivity equation, but only in so far as location choice is a non-linear function of observed 
determinants of productivity (assumed to be linear in the same determinants).  23 
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Let  ijt i ijt u υ θ + =  so that we can re-write (7) as  
 
(11)   ijt
j
ij j ijt ij j
R
ijt u D z g x A + + + + + = ∑ ) ( ˆ ln φ δ γ β α  
Following  Dubin and McFadden (1984), we can obtain consistent estimates of the 
parameters of (11) in one of two ways. One is to estimate it as a reduced form  having  
replaced  ij D  by  the estimate,  ij P ˆ ,  of  ij P  in (10), that is, to estimate the following 
equation by GLS:  
(12)  ijt
j
ij j ijt ij j
R
ijt e P z g x A + + + + + = ∑ ) ˆ ( ˆ ln ψ δ γ β α  
where  ijt e  is an iid  random error term possibly including a plant effect that is time 
invariant but is nonetheless uncorrelated with all the other right hand side variables. 
Alternatively, we can keep the location dummies but directly control for the variation 
across locations of the conditional expectation of  ijt u . Under certain regularity 
assumptions, the latter is given by (Dubin and McFadden, 1984): 
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The selectivity bias corrected formulation of (11) is then 
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While the estimation of equations (12) and (14) is not computationally difficult, the use 
of 40 city dummies with an effective sample of 1500 establishments inevitably creates a 
mulicollinearity problem  since we are measuring both business environment and 
indicators of economic geography at the city level. To deal with this we have defined the 
location dummies,  ij D , at the region level in terms of which we have also defined the  24 
corresponding location probabilities  ij P ˆ , while continuing to measure  j x   and  j g    at the 
city level. This would inevitably mean that we would not be able to eliminate selectivity 
bias entirely. We will nonetheless know the direction in which the estimator of any of the 
parameters of the productivity equation is biased. We can also tell whether the estimate 
that we would obtain by estimating (12) and (14) with region dummies and region level 
correction terms is a lower bound or an upper bound of the estimate we would obtain by 
using city dummies and city level correction terms. This is on the assumption that 
selectivity bias is non-decreasing in absolute value in the level of aggregation of location.  
 
IV.  Estimation results  
 
 
Preliminary estimates  
 
Table 4 provides exact definitions and (full sample) descriptive statistics of the variables 





ln  , as defined by equation (1) and (2) on our indicators of business 
environment and economic geography with business age, line activity, region of location, 
and time of observation as controls. We have also included among the regressors an 
adjustment factor for inter firm differences in product market power. We have defined the 
region dummies based on the shares of states in the volume of foreign direct investment 
(or FDI) India attracted over the four-year period from year 2000 to year 2003. We refer 
to one group of states as “high FDI” states. These are the states of Maharashtra, Delhi, 
Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, which, together, accounted for almost 90 percent of the all 
India inflow of FDI over the same period (Lall and Chakravorty 2005).  The second 
group consists of the states of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, which attracted significant 
amounts of FDI over the same period, but in volumes much lower than any of the four 
high FDI states. We refer to these as “moderate FDI” states. We classify the remaining 6 
states as “low FDI” states, by which we mean those that did not attract any significant 
amounts of foreign capital over the same period.  The fact that Marharshtra, Delhi, Tamil 
Nadu and Karnataka have attracted the bulk of FDI into India recently is consistent with  25 
the general perception among investors that these the states have the “best” business 
environment in India. Responses to the World Bank Investment Climate surveys seem to 
confirm that this reputation holds among domestic small and medium sized firms as well. 
What we have grouped as moderate FDI states are also ranked higher by respondents of 
the World Bank survey than the remaining six states. If self-selectivity of businesses to or 
away from better business environment cities takes place on unobservable factors, we 
should observe it at the level of mobility between high FDI states and low FDI states as 
well. 
 
The first panel of the table reports OLS estimates of equation (7) with location dummies 
aggregated into the three regions of FDI flows with moderate FDI states as the base 
group. The second panel presents random effects (GLS) estimates of the same 
specifications. We report t-values based on robust standard errors in both cases. Within 
each panel, specifications differ only to the extent of exclusion restrictions intended to 
highlight correlation among exogenous variables. The specifications that we should focus 
on in each panel are the first two. The difference between the two within each panel is 
that we adjust for differences in product market power only in one of them. The most 
obvious significance of the omission is that a halving of the goodness of fit of both the 
OLS and the GLS regressions.  
 
Comparison of the GLS estimates with their OLS counterparts suggests the presence of 
heterogeneity bias: our estimate of rho is statistically different from zero in all alternative 
specifications, and the GLS estimates of the effects of economic geography are as a rule 
significantly different from their OLS counterparts. This is setting aside the problem of 
selectivity bias to which we now turn, and of which there are signs already in Table 5. 
One sign is that, although labor regulation comes out as a statistically significant 
influence on productivity in the GLS panel, this is not the case with power shortages.  
The GLS estimates suggest that a doubling of the percentage of managers complaining 
about labor regulation would be associated with a four-percentage point fall in labor 
productivity. This seems to be a plausible figure in the light of estimates provided in 
other studies. On the other hand, the estimate of the coefficient of the power shortage  26 
proxy is not statistically significant. Even if it were the magnitude the estimate would 
suggest that a doubling of the percentage of output lost due to power outages would 
reduce labor productivity by only 3 percentage points. A second indication of the 
presence of selectivity bias is that random effects estimates of localization economies are 
negative. While this could suggest congestion effects, the latter is an unlikely scenario of 





Modeling location choice 
 
As the first step for testing for this kind of bias we estimate in Table 6 the conditional 
logit location choice equation (10) at the level of regions rather than cities, the regions 
being one of high FDI states, moderate FDI states and low FDI states. It should be 
stressed that this is not intended to substitute for an accurate description of how 
businesses have sorted themselves across cities of our sample. The goal is, rather, to see 
if the same sorting process has significantly biased the estimates of the effects of business 
environment and economic geography shown in Table 5. If there is indeed a location 
selectivity bias in the estimates of Table 5 due to the correlation of unobservable location 
or business characteristics with productivity, then it is inevitable that the same bias will 
manifest itself in the role of business environment and economic geography on 
productivity gaps between high FDI states and low FDI states.
25  
 
The estimates reported in Table 6 are all maximum likelihood. Because of high 
multicollinearity we cannot include region dummies alongside our indicators of market 
access and localization economies in. As a result the most general of the specifications of 
the Table, namely, column 3, excludes those variables. While this means that we would 
be unable to identify the effects of agglomeration economies and market access in 
location decisions, the inclusion of region fixed effects should enable us to identify the 
effect of business environment and firm characteristics. The sign of the fixed effects 
themselves partly reflects the fact that a greater proportion of the sample comes from low 
                                                 
25 This is assuming that location choice is defined in terms of cities rather than regions.  27 
FDI states than from high FDI states. Given the allocation of the sample between the 
three regions, the coefficient of the interaction term between plant age and high FDI 
indicates that younger plants are more likely to be found in high FDI states, meaning that 
more recent establishments have tended to locate in those states than in moderate or low 
FDI states.  Given the period of establishments, larger businesses are more likely to start 
in high FDI states than in low FDI states as can be seen from the interaction terms of start 
up size and regions. The interaction terms between region and whether or not an 
establishment is located in the state of birth of the business owner shows that owner 
managed establishments are less likely to be found in the home state of the business 
owner in low FDI states .  The coefficient of the interaction between industry groupings 
and regions suggests that moderate to high tech businesses are less likely to locate in low 
FDI states than in high FDI states. 
 
Controlling for line of activity, time of establishment startup, scale, birth state of 
the business owner, and geographic characteristics of regions, the log odds ratio of a new 
plant locating in a region is lower where labor regulation is stronger and power shortages 
more severe (column 3).  This is indication that excessive labor regulation and power 
shortages translate into lower industrial labor productivity in a city in the long run in the 
sense that they make firms less likely to locate plants in those cities. The corresponding 
short run effects are effects on the productivity of plants (conditional on location) are in 
Table 5, but are contaminated by the long run (or location) effects of Table 6. Our 
purpose in estimating equation (7) as reported in Table 6 is to identify the true short run 




Correcting for mobility bias 
 
We report estimates of business environment and economic geography on plant level 
productivity after correcting for the selectivity bias in Tables 8 and 9.  In Table 8 we do 
the correction by estimating equation (14) as a random effects model by GLS, that is, by 
including our estimate of the conditional expectation of the error term of equation (7)  28 
computed from the location probability estimates of Table 6.  A comparison of column 5 
of Table 8 with those of Table 5 would seem to suggest that no selectivity bias involved 
in the estimates reported in Table 5. None of the selectivity terms in Table 5 are 
statistically different from zero, and individual coefficient estimates are not significantly 
different in otherwise the same specifications across the two tables. However, the reason 
for this outcome is the high degree of collinearity between the selectivity term and the 
region dummies rather than true lack of statistical significance of the former. Indeed the 
outcome sharply contradicts what we seen Table 9 as strong evidence for the presence of 
selectivity bias in Table 5. The advantage of the reduced form specification that we 
estimated in Table 9 is precisely that it avoids the multicollineary problem of Table 8. We 
also see more plausible coefficient estimates in Table 9 than those in Table 8. This and 
the high values of the Hausman-Wu endogeneity test statistic reported at the bottom of 




In estimating equation (12) in the first panel of Table 9, we replace the region dummies 
by probabilities of selection calculated from the choice probabilities of column 3 of Table 
6. In the second panel of Table 9 we report the same correction for selectivity bias, but 
based on a multinomial selection equation in which location characteristics are assumed 
not to matter. This latter specification is directly estimated in Table 7, but can also be 
thought of as what we would obtain by imposing the restriction on equation (10) that all 
locations are identical in terms of observable characteristics.
27  In spite of the contrast 
between the two specifications of the selection process, the results are quite similar across 
the two panels in terms of the direction of selectivity bias though not in the magnitude of 
bias. The bias is larger when we assume that businesses self select on location 
characteristics as well as own characteristics. Since this is more consistent with profit 
maximizing behavior, and the selectivity corrected parameter estimates seem to be more 
                                                 
26 Corresponding GLS estimators of Table 5 are used as the efficient counterpart in the computation of the 
Hausman-Wu test statistics reported in Table 9. 
27 In directly estimating this specification in Table 7 we are in effect assuming that businesses choose plant 
locations by some (non-profit maximizing) criterion that does not take into account location characteristics.   29 
plausible with respect to agglomeration economies, we will focus our discussion on the 
first panel of Table 9. 
 
The most important conclusion that we draw from Table 9 is probably that, in general, 
the effects of business environment and economic geography that we would obtain by 
estimating equation (7) by GLS as a random effects model would be seriously biased.  
Both the direction of bias and its magnitude vary by specific aspects of the business 
environment or geography.  Thus it turns out that the uncorrected GLS estimates of the 
effect of labor regulation  from column 7 of Table 5 is virtually identical to that in 
column 4 of Table 9. On the other hand, it is clear that the effect of power shortages as 
estimated in column 7 of Table 5 is seriously biased upwards. According to the 
selectivity corrected estimate of column 4 of Table 9, a doubling of the average reported 
loss of output due to power outages would reduce average labor productivity per plant by 
22 percentage points, as opposed to reduction by only 3 percentage points according to 
the estimate in column 7 of Table 5. A similar comparison of column 4 of Table 9 with 
column 7 of Table 5 shows that estimates of the productivity effect of foreign market 
access that we obtain by estimating equation (7) as random effects model would not be 
selectivity biased, while corresponding estimates of the productivity effects of domestic 
market access would be upward biased by almost a factor of almost 2:1.  In contrast, the 
uncorrected estimates of agglomeration effects in Table 5 are hugely downward biased 
due to selectivity. 
 
 
We should perhaps stress again that the fact that we used region dummies in Tables 5, 6 
and 9 in lieu of the city dummies of equations (11) to (14) and have used region, rather 
than city, selection probabilities, means that the estimates reported in column (4) of Table 
9 would not necessarily eliminate selectivity bias entirely. However, we can tell the 
direction in which estimated in column 7 of Table 5 would be biased for corresponding 
true parameter values. More importantly, depending on the direction of this bias we can 
tell whether the estimates  in column 4 in Table 9 are a lower bound or an upper bound of 
the true parameter values or to estimates that we would obtain by disaggregating the level  30 
at which we model location choice. We can thus conclude based on Tables 5 and 9 that, 
there is no indication that the estimates of the effect of labor regulation or of foreign 
market access on productivity obtained by applying GLS to equation (7) is selectivity 
biased.  On the other hand our estimates of agglomeration economies obtained in the 
same way are seriously biased downwards while the corresponding estimates of the 
productivity effects of power shortages and domestic market access are seriously biased 
upwards. Since the direction of bias is unlikely to change as we disaggregate the level of 
location choice, we conclude that our estimates of the effects of labor regulation and 
foreign market access as reported in column (4) of Table 9 are consistent. On the other 
hand our estimates of the effect of power shortages reported in the same column should 
be an upper bound for the true value as must be the effect of domestic market access. 
This means that our estimates of agglomeration economies and of the effect of power 
shortages on productivity should, if anything, understate the true effect, while we could 
be overestimating the effect of domestic market access.   
 
With this caveat in mind, the key finding summed up in column 4 of Table 9 is that both 
business environment and economic geography are powerful influences on plant level 
productivity. Concerning the influence of geography we find that  a doubling of a city’s 
domestic market access relative to the all India maximum would almost triple labor 
productivity in the average plant in that city. Secondly, a doubling of the distance of the 
city from the nearest port relative to the all India maximum would reduce labor 
productivity in the average plant by 10%. Third, a doubling of the own industry 
employment size in the city relative to the  all India maximum would increase labor 
productivity in the average plant by almost 40%. One piece of evidence that business 
environment is a powerful influence on plant productivity is that a doubling of the 
percentage of businesses in the city that feel seriously constrained by labor regulation 
would be associated with 4% decline in labor productivity. A second is that a doubling of 
businesses estimates of percentage of sales lost due to outages would be associated with a 
22% loss in labor productivity. 
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Accounting for inter-city productivity gaps 
 
What do these results tell us in terms of the relative importance of business environment 
and economic geography as determinants of plant level productivity? And what can we 
infer from them about the relative importance of individual elements of business 
environment or of economic geography? Because of differences in units of measurement, 
we cannot say anything about either of these questions simply by looking at coefficient 
estimates in Table 9. We can, however, estimate the fraction of the observed gap between 
cities and regions that can be attributed to business environment or to economic 
geography or to any components thereof based on the coefficients.  In Figure 1 we show 
how the productivity gap among garments producers that we observe in our data across 
cities are divided into a component due to differences in business environment and one 
due to differences in economic geography. In the chart the average log of total 
productivity for the state of Delhi has been normalized to zero. One obvious result from 
the figure is that the business environment component is larger. It is true that garments 
producers in cities such as Bangalore and Chennai owe their greater productivity to the 
more favorable economic geography of their location rather than to their business 
environment being better. However, it turns out that business environment accounts for 
the greater share of the productivity premium or shortfall of most other cities.  
 
A second striking pattern in Figure 1 is that the cities where economic geography 
is less favorable tend to have a better business environment.  It is as if the typical city 
compensates for adverse economic geography by improving its business climate or 
locations with more favorable geography can afford to have a poorer business 
environment. There are notable exceptions to this pattern including the cities of Mumbai, 
Chennai, Surat and Comibatore, all which seem to have a productivity premium over 
Delhi on account both of better economic geography and of better business environment.  
 
Figure 2 shows the relative strength of the two components of economic 
geography. The chart leaves little doubt that market access is by far the more important 
element in terms of explaining the productivity gaps we observe across the forty cities.  32 
However, it is also clear that differences in agglomeration economies typically account 
for fairly large fractions of those gaps. For example, of the 26 % geography related 
productivity shortfall of the average garments producers in the city of Bhopal (in the state 
of Madhya Pradesh) relatively to Delhi, 4 percentage points are due to the fact that there 
is a larger cluster of garment producers in New Delhi. The balance of shortfall reflects 
that Delhi has far greater market access than Bhopal. Similarly, 3 percentage points of the 
22 percentage point productivity premium of the average garment producer in Mumbai 
over its counterpart in Delhi are due to the greater concentration of garment production in 
Mumbai. The remaining 19 percentage points reflect Mumbai’s greater market access. 
 
The productivity gap between plants in Mumbai and those in Delhi underscores the 
importance of the distinction between the domestic and foreign components of market 
access. It also illustrates that, although domestic market access is probably the more 
important of the two components for an economy as large as India’s, foreign market 
access could be more important for coastal regions. This is what we see in Figure 3, 
where most cities are shown to “lose out” in productivity to Delhi simply because Delhi 
has far greater domestic market access. At the same time we see that garments producers 
in several major port cities including Mumbai and Chennai have a productivity advantage 
over their counterparts in Delhi in spite of their lower domestic market access. The 
reason for this seems to be that as port cities, greater foreign market access more than 
makes up for that deficiency. 
 
In Figure 4 we bring together the various components of business environment and 
economic geography with overall inter-city productivity gaps, again among garments 
producers. The chart highlights further two points already made with the other charts. 
One of these is that differences in business environment explain more of the variation in 
productivity across cities than economic geography does. The second is that economic 
geography and business environment tend to move in opposing directions in accounting 
for inter-city gaps in the sense that cities that have large shortfalls on account of less 
favorable economic geography tend to have a better business environment. In addition, 
Figure 4 shows that business environment and economic geography together explain a far  33 
larger proportion of inter-city variation in average business productivity than is suggested 
by the relatively low measures of goodness of fit of the model estimated in Table 9 to 
firm level observations. In particular, the proportion of inter-city gaps in productivity due 
to differences in business environment is not only larger than that attributable to 
geography, but it is a high proportion of the overall productivity gap. In most cases the  
productivity gap attributable to business environment is more than a third of the total.  
 
We can assess the relative importance of the two components of business 
environment with the help Figure 5. Power shortages are clearly the more costly 
deficiency in cities such as Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh and Ahmedabad in Gujarat. 
However, this is not the case with cities of Noida (Uttar Pradesh) and Gurgaon 
(Haryana), where differences in labor regulation explain a greater proportion of 
productivity gaps compared to Delhi. It indeed seems safe to conclude that both aspects 
of the business environment are equally important sources of gaps when considered 
across the 40 cities as a whole. It also appears that, in general, labor regulation and power 
shortages vary in the same direction, in contrast to the seeming opposition between the 
directions of movement of economic geography and business environment as a whole.   
 
V.  Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we have analyzed the productivity of manufacturing plants sampled from 
40 of India’s largest industrial cities. The analysis shows that there are large productivity 
gaps across locations which, to a large extent, we explain by differences in two attributes 
-- economic geography, and local business environment. 
 
This indicates that governments can help bridge regional disparities in industrial 
development in India by inducing the “right business environment” in locations where 
economic geography is not as favorable as in industrially advanced cities and regions. 
There is of course nothing in our analysis that shows that regional disparity in industrial 
development is necessarily bad in terms of aggregate efficiency. To the extent that 
bridging regional gaps in industrial performance is desirable, however, our results 
suggest that governments can help achieve this by improving the business environment of  34 
locations despite the presence of strong forces of economic geography that tend to 
generate or magnify the gaps.  
 
India is not the only large developing economy where regional disparities in 
industrial development constitute an active policy issue. In various forms and to different 
degrees regional equity in industrial development seems to be a policy issue in countries 
such as China and Brazil as well. We therefore hope that our results would inform 
prospective studies in that broader context. To the extent that regional inequality in 
industrial development is a legitimate policy concern, we hope the paper contributes to 
better understanding of the business environment as an instrument of policy intervention. 
The notion seems too common in development circles that better performing locations or 
regions must have better business environment on the average. Our paper suggests that 
this is not necessarily true unless one defines business environment widely enough to 
subsume all aspects of the economic environment of producers including the region’s 
economic geography. This would certainly make the concept of business environment 
tautological and redundant. If we define it to include only those aspects of the economic 
environment that government policy can influence in the medium to the short run, then it 
is not necessarily the case that the most productive locations have the best policy 
environment. The case for improving the business environment of relatively backward 
regions through policy reforms need not thus be that those policies are necessarily worse 
than those in more advanced locations. It can be that, in the presence of sources of cost 
advantages no one controls, it makes sense for governments to compensate for them by 
acting on factors that they can influence.  
 
Our findings should be qualified by a major data limitation that we have pointed out in 
the paper. This is that our data come from the most industrially advanced cities in India. 
In terms of regions, each state is represented in the World Bank Investment Climate 
Survey by the top three or four industrial cities in that state. We are therefore comparing 
locations across the top end of the size distribution of cities and urban centers. It is 
possible that as we move down the distribution the relative importance of geography and 
business environment shifts from what is reported here. It is difficult to say if these  35 
findings are representative of smaller cities. However, the disparity among the forty cities 
analyzed here is a large component of the spatial inequality in industrial activity in India 
at the moment, and is probably what many people have largely in mind when the issue of 
regional (as opposed to local) inequality is raised in the policy literature. 
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Appendix A: Measuring Domestic Market Access 
 
In computing domestic market access, Lall et al (2004) use the negative exponential 
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i I  is the market 
access index of location i,  j S  is the purchasing power of potential trading partner 
(location)  j ,  ij d  is the distance between  i and j , b  is a constant describing the rate at 
which interaction between locations  i  and  j decreases with the distance between them, 
and ais a constant point of inflection of the negative exponential function. In actual 
computation Lall et al  (2004) proxy  j S  by the population of  j , while they measure  ij d  
by the estimated average time it takes to travel between i and  j , on the Indian road 
network. The advantage of using average travel times rather than distance is that travel 
time would take into account the influence of road and vehicle quality as well as 
topography on effective interaction between locations. Their market access index is 
therefore positively correlated with road transport as part of the physical infrastructure on 
which business in i operate. To the extent that the purchasing power of i itself enters the 
computation of 
ne
i I , the index should also be a good proxy for the urbanization 
economies that businesses located in i could benefit from.  To the extent that the market 
access variable reflects the quality of transport infrastructure it should be positively 
correlated with factor productivity. To the extent it reflects urbanization economies of or 
access to external markets, it should influence the cost of inputs (or supplier access) as 
well as enabling firms to enjoy scale economies by increasing the demand for firms 
products.   39 
 
Appendix B: The Levinshon-Petrin Estimator 
 
The Levinshon-Petrin identification strategy is based on the assumption that the demand 
for intermediate inputs depends on 
R
it A ln  and another state variable, namely, capital 
stock,  it k , that is,  ) ln , (
R
it it t it A k m m = .  Levinshon and Petrin (2003) show that provided 
that (a) technology is such that  the production function is twice differentiable and the 
cross partial derivatives of  it m  and 
R
it A ln  exist,   (b) all firms are price takers,  and (c) 
current investment does not influence current productivity,  it m  is monotonically 
increasing in 
R
it A ln  so that the intermediate input demand function can be inverted to 
express 
R
it A ln  as a function of capital stock and intermediate input demand: 
) , ( ln it it t
R
it m k a A = . If we further assume that productivity is a first-order Markov 








it e A A E A + = ] ln | [ln ln , where  0 ) ( =
R
it ite k E , the influence of 
R
it e  
on input demands can be controlled for fully in the estimation of the production function 
so as to avoid the simultaneity bias OLS estimates of factor shares are subject to. 
Levinshon and Petrin (2003) propose a two stage estimation procedure  in which 
consistent estimates all factor share parameters of the  production function can be 
obtained.  
 
The first of these stages involves the consistent estimation of the share of non-state input 
variables  by applying OLS to the log transformation of equation (3), but having 
augmented it by including a third order polynomial approximation in  it k  and  it m  of the 
unknown  t a  function as a term. Parameter estimates resulting from this step are then 
used to predict 
R
it A ln . In the second stage a consistent estimate for the share of capital is 
obtained by minimizing the excess of capital over the shares of all factor inputs and the 
mean of the predictions of 
R
it A ln  obtained from the first step. 
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             Table 1 : Productivity profiles and business charactristics across sector     
                  
sector  Value   Fixed   Average  Average  Average   Number of  Proportion   Proportion of  
   added  assets  annual  Number   age of  employees  of  businesses   
   per    per  wages  of  business at  startup  businesses aged   
   worker  worker  per  workers  (years)    in state of  five years   





$)  ( US $)           of owners  years or less 
Food  & bev  5938  3741  1114  86  16  32  0.81  0.30   
Textile  5123  4440  1292  258  19 134 0.76 0.19   
Garments  3624  2006  852  52  20  25 0.86 0.31   
Leather  4751  2702  762  67  12  18 0.83 0.29   
Chemicals  5113  4600  1013  101  14  25 0.82 0.23   
Pharma  7492  5658  1374  216  32  49 0.88 0.19   
Metal  works  2737  2045  749  43  34  14 0.82 0.25   
Consumer  electonics  4520  2616  1067  38  26  15 0.90 0.24   
Electrical  goods  4311  2674  1159  48  13  16 0.86 0.21   
Auto  components  3683  3064  1056  48  14  21 0.79 0.24   
Machine  tools  6748  3875  1578  84  16  27 0.93 0.16   
All  sectors  4783  3433  1087  101  20  39 0.83 0.24    
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            Table 2:  Business environment, economic geography and labor productivity across states 
                
   Log difference with all India   Business environment                      Geographic variables 
    average per establishment in  indicator             
        State 
 
Annual   Fixed   Annual   Estimated 
Output 
lost Businesses    Domestic  Log of  
Own 
industry 
   value  assets  wage  price  lost to  constrained   market   distance  local  
   added  per  bill per  cost   power  by labor  access  from    
   per  worker  worker  margin  outages  regulation    nearest    
   worker            (%)  (%)  index  port  employment 
Andra Pradesh  0.19  0.11  -0.05  0.02  5.29  2.46  6.88  5.92  4.39 
Delhi 0.11  0.31  0.15  0.00  11.12  68.53  6.99  6.84  4.52 
Gujarat 0.38  0.17  0.02  0.05  3.51  7.04  6.87  4.26  4.54 
Karnataka 0.10  0.25  0.00  0.07  12.63  50.07  6.89  4.42  4.45 
Kerala 0.04  0.13  -0.25  0.06  9.47  6.04  6.93  2.99  4.35 
Maharashtra -0.05  -0.42  0.16 -0.03 6.41  17.77 6.88  3.81  4.51 
Punjab 0.09  0.33  0.17  -0.01  10.40  2.75  6.93  6.96  4.43 
Tamil  Nadu  -0.04  -0.05  -0.15 -0.08 7.20  28.74 6.91  3.70  4.49 
West Bengal  -0.13  -0.45  -0.20  0.03  6.00  9.09  6.88  4.04  4.30 
Uttar Pradesh  -0.01  0.24  0.03  0.00  15.08  2.12  6.97  6.84  4.43 
Haryana  -0.10  0.28  0.21 -0.08 8.62  22.27 6.97  6.84  4.41 
Madhya 
Pradesh  -0.22 -0.38 -0.24  -0.01  10.12  2.07  6.86  6.18  4.36 
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Table 3: OLS and Levinsohn-Petrin Estiamtes of Cobb-Douglas Specification of Production Function  
            by sector             
 Dependent variables= Log (annual value added)           
            
  
            OLS 
estimates 
 Levinsohn-Petrin 





(wage  Log (fixed   Log (wage  Observations  
Number 
of 
   assets)  bill)  assets)  bill)     Firms 
All firms  0.266  0.832  0.138  0.551  18842  7668 
   (57.88)**  (175.91)**  (5.20)**  (43.36)**     
All nine sectors   0.280  0.818  0.133  0.546  16516  6662 
   (56.18)**  (158.98)**  (5.36)**  (42.93)**     
Food /beverages  0.270  0.836  0.002  0.570  2009  839 
   (17.01)**  (49.96)**  (0.02)  (18.62)**     
Textiles   0.302  0.788  0.172  0.487  3084  1216 
   (24.80)**  (60.02)**  (3.34)**  (24.04)**     
Garments 0.305  0.793  0.114  0.543  4190  1686 
   (31.55)**  (83.45)**  (3.05)**  (26.35)**     
Leather goods   0.276  0.840  0.203  0.514  1095  439 
   (16.09)**  (50.11)**  (3.16)**  (10.43)**     
Chemicals, Drugs and pharmaceuticals  0.297  0.801  0.251  0.502  2666  1126 
   (20.91)**  (52.74)**  (3.17)**  (15.37)**     
Electrical goods/equipment  0.177  0.920  0.085  0.664  1322  537 
   (10.60)**  (52.95)**  (0.86)  (12.00)**     
Auto parts  0.269  0.820  0.074  0.558  1057  391 
   (12.93)**  (37.54)**  (0.96)  (6.75)**       
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level           
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  Table 4: Descriptive statistics    
     
Variable                                        Definition  Mean  Std. Dev.
           
Productivity variables:      
Value added   Log of annual value added per worker (US $)  7.93 1.03
Fixed assets  Log end-of-fiscal year book value of fixed  assets (in US $)  7.44 1.16
Average wage rate  Log of annual wage bill per employee (US $)  6.68 0.73
Employment  Log end-of-fiscal year number of employees   3.24 1.29
     
       
Business characteristics:      
Business age  Log number of years since the establishment was set up  2.48 0.81
Start up size  Number of employee's at the startup of the establishment  2.49 1.09
Entrepreneurial roots located  Dummy=1 if the business is located in the birth state of the current owner  0.83 0.38
       
Business environment variables      
Ouput loss to power outage (%)  Log of city average of estimated % of annual output lost due to power outages   2.06 0.51
Constrained by labor regulation (%)  Log of proportion of businesses held back by labor regulation in the city  1.94 1.49
       
Geographic variables:      
Foreign market access  Log distance of city from the nearest major port   3.17 1.42
Domestic market access  Log  of ratio of city's domestic market access index to the all India maximum  6.91 0.05
Own industry local size  Log of own industry  employment in the city  4.44 0.09
       
Sector:     
Food  Dummy=1 if in the food and bevareges industry  0.11 
Textiles  Dummy=1 if in textiles  0.13 
Garments  Dummy=1 if in garmentts  0.14 
Leather goods  Dummy=1 if in leather goods  0.04 
Drugs and pharmaceutical  Dummy=1 if in drugs and pharmaceuticals  0.10 
Chemicals  Dummy=1 if in chemicals  0.11 
Consumer electronics  Dummy=1 if in consumer electonics  0.08 
Electrical white goods  Dummy=1 if in electrical white goods  0.07 
Auto parts  Dummy=1 if in the auto componensts industry  0.13 
Fabricated metals  Dummy=1 if in fabricated metals  0.05 
Machine tools  Dummy=1 if in machine toos  0.04  
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  Table 5: OLS and GLS Estimates of TFP Equation Uncorrected for selectivity bias      
  Dependent variable Log TFP (adjusted for skills)        
         OLS                 Random effects (GLS)    
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9) (10)  (11)  (12) 
Adjustment for                   
market  power  1.842   1.839 1.843 1.838 1.860 1.524    1.523 1.524 1.522 1.526 
    (50.28)**  (50.43)** (50.26)** (50.37)** (50.07)** (51.41)**  (51.44)** (51.39)** (51.42)** (51.32)** 
Foreign market                    
access  -0.120 -0.147 -0.122 -0.111 -0.114     -0.113  -0.143  -0.115 -0.103 -0.105  
    (10.05)** (9.54)**  (10.40)** (9.64)**  (9.97)**      (6.08)** (5.89)** (6.30)**  (5.71)**  (5.92)** 
Domestic market                    
access  2.887 3.311 2.845 2.602 2.531     3.155  3.540  3.106 2.805 2.719  
    (7.21)** (6.34)** (7.15)** (6.70)** (6.59)**     (4.79)** (4.13)** (4.75)**  (4.39)**  (4.31)** 
Own  industry  local  -0.166 -0.010 -0.148 -0.102 -0.074     -0.128  0.035  -0.110 -0.044 -0.016  
l o c a l   s i z e                    
    (0.95) (0.04) (0.86) (0.59) (0.43)     (0.46)  (0.10)  (0.40) (0.16) (0.06)  
Constrained by 
labor                    
regulation  (%)  -0.033 -0.032 -0.034     -0.005 -0.040  -0.045  -0.041     -0.013 
    (2.84)**  (2.12)*  (2.97)**    (0.48)  (2.14)*  (1.85)  (2.23)*    (0.74) 
Output lost to 
power                   
outages  (%)  -0.032 -0.043       -0.076 -0.031  0.098    -0.044   -0.067 
    (0.94)  (1.28)     (2.33)*  (0.61)  (1.47)   (0.87)   (1.35) 
Business  age  0.158 0.182 0.159 0.154 0.156 0.160 0.161  0.199  0.162 0.157 0.158 0.164 
    (10.13)** (8.94)**  (10.22)** (9.93)**  (10.03)** (10.15)** (6.91)** (6.57)** (6.96)**  (6.76)**  (6.82)**  (7.00)** 
High  FDI  State  -0.478 -0.579 -0.500 -0.518 -0.551 -0.344 -0.474  -0.652  -0.495 -0.522 -0.554 -0.338 
    (9.61)**  (10.05)** (11.39)** (10.87)** (13.60)** (7.03)** (6.22)**  (6.58)**  (7.25)** (7.15)** (8.79)** (4.52)** 
Low  FDI  State  -0.529 -0.581 -0.552 -0.502 -0.532 -0.412 -0.557  -0.702  -0.580 -0.526 -0.557 -0.434 
    (10.32)** (9.82)**  (12.27)** (9.95)**  (11.94)** (8.72)** (6.96)**  (6.75)**  (8.17)** (6.68)** (7.92)** (5.97)** 
Constant  -23.991 -18.441 -23.807 -22.368 -22.031 -5.328  -24.479  -20.431  -24.254 -22.504 -22.091 -3.724 
    (9.42)** (5.54)** (9.38)** (9.01)** (8.92)** (27.21)** (5.86)** (3.76)** (5.83)**  (5.52)**  (5.46)**  (20.51)** 
Industry  dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yer  dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                     
Observations  3525 3525 3525 3525 3525 3531 3525  3525  3525 3525 3525 3525 
Establishments           1431  1431  1431  1431  1431  1431 
R-squared  0.60 0.31 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.6 0.31  0.6  0.59 0.6  0.58 
Rho                    0.88  0.88  0.88  0.88  0.88  0.89 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses                   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%                     
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                                         Table 6:   Maximum likelihood estimation of condtional logit s 
  pecifiation of location choice    
          (1)       (2)     (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
                    
Interaction of medium to           
 high tech industries**** with:           
            
High  FDI  States      -0.903 -1.232  -1.005 -0.923 
        (5.00)** (7.08)**  (5.71)** (5.02)** 
Low FDI States      -1.056  -1.231  -1.109  -0.999 
        (5.72)** (6.94)**  (6.17)** (5.27)** 
Interaction of "entrepreneurial            
 roots located" businesses with           
             
High  FDI  States      -0.109 -0.369  -0.178 -0.012 
        (0.33) (1.14)  (0.54) (0.04) 
Low FDI States      -1.874  -1.797  -1.850  -1.699 
        (6.05)** (5.93)**  (6.06)** (5.21)** 
Interaction of startup size with           
            
High  FDI  States      -0.161 -0.240  -0.184 -0.159 
       (2.46)*  (3.86)**  (2.91)**  (2.39)* 
Low FDI States      -0.351  -0.367  -0.355  -0.326 
        (4.98)** (5.46)**  (5.19)** (4.51)** 
Interaction of  business age with:             
High  FDI  States  -0.362    -0.269 -0.330  -0.289 -0.282 
   (3.56)**    (2.38)*  (3.10)**  (2.65)**  (2.45)* 
Low FDI States  -0.217    -0.015  -0.082  -0.035  -0.017 
    (2.20)*    (0.13) (0.74)  (0.31) (0.15) 
 Constrained by labor regulation (%)      -0.344  -0.645  -0.913   
       (4.09)**  (8.13)**  (10.41)**   
Output lost to power outage (%)      -2.058      -3.995 
       (10.31)**      (14.44)** 
Domestic  market  access    -2.913   5.000    
      (0.74)   (1.59)    
Own industry local size    -3.650      8.902  -16.983 
     (2.85)**    (6.44)**  (8.60)** 
High  FDI  States  1.613    2.746 3.206  2.644 3.033 
    (5.92)**    (5.73)** (6.85)**  (5.60)** (6.12)** 
Low FDI States  1.373    4.151  4.186  4.035  4.068 
    (5.12)**    (8.69)** (9.05)**  (8.64)** (8.24)** 
             
Log likelihood  -1541  -1619 -1291 -1348 -1328 -1256
Pseudo R2  0.05  0.01 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.2
LR chisq(k)  166  10.4 566 453 493 637
Observations  4299  4299  4299 4299  4299 4299 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           
*** medium to high tech industries include auto parts production, drugs and pharmaceuticals, and  46 
 
                                                  Table 7:  Mutinomial specification of location choice   
        
               Specification (1)          Specification (2) 
   High FDI States  Low FDI States  High FDI States  Low FDI States
Business age  -0.130  0.034  -0.230  -0.059 
   (0.102)  (0.104)  (0.097)*  (0.098) 
Startup size  -0.181  -0.357  -0.168  -0.324 
   (0.068)**  (0.074)**  (0.063)**  (0.068)** 
Entrepreneurial roots located  -0.793  -2.221  -0.738  -2.232 
   (0.338)*  (0.318)**  (0.333)*  (0.310)** 
Food 0.396  1.070     
   (0.323)  (0.323)**     
Textiles -0.172  0.411     
   (0.271)  (0.274)     
Garments 2.771  2.728     
   (0.527)**  (0.535)**     
Drugs, pharmaceuticals and chemicals  -0.802  -0.802     
   (0.196)**  (0.215)**     
Auto parts   -0.028  1.255     
   (0.289)  (0.273)**     
Constant 2.250  3.202  2.426  3.688 
   (0.458)**  (0.453)**  (0.435)**  (0.426)** 
Observations                       1405                       1405   
Log likelihood                     - 1297                        -1392   
Chisquare (k)                         349                         159   
Pseudo Rsquared                         0.12                        0.05    
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
  47 
 
                                            Table 8:  Conditional Expectation Correction of TFP Equation : CLogit  selection equation 
  Dependent variable Log TFP (adjusted for skills)     
             
                  O L S        Random Effects (GLS)   
               All  High FDI   Low FDI                  All  High FDI   Low FDI    
       States  States     States  States   
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8)  
Adjustment for market                     
power  1.841   2.004 1.692 1.520   1.501 1.634  
    (49.61)**   (33.55)** (33.85)** (51.49)**   (29.40)** (43.09)**  
Foreign  market  access  -0.121 -0.156  -0.132 -0.155 -0.114 -0.143  -0.133 -0.142  
   (9.99)**  (9.89)**  (6.14)**  (8.51)** (6.11)** (5.92)**  (4.06)** (4.80)**  
Domestic  market  access  2.925 3.199  2.820 1.536 3.164 3.504  3.160 1.606  
    (7.20)** (6.01)**  (3.15)** (3.49)** (4.79)** (4.09)**  (2.23)*  (2.11)*   
Own industry local size  -0.209  0.006  0.022  -0.519  -0.147  0.027  0.040  -0.354   
    (1.19) (0.03)  (0.06) (2.08)*  (0.53) (0.07)  (0.07) (0.82)  
 Constrained by labor regulation (%)  -0.030  -0.033  -0.009  -0.019  -0.039  -0.043  -0.022  -0.028   
    (2.60)**  (2.16)*  (0.30) (1.20) (2.08)*  (1.78)  (0.51) (1.02)  
Output lost to power outage (%)  -0.037  0.124  -0.030  0.088  -0.029  0.100  -0.002  0.075   
    (1.07) (2.77)**  (0.45) (1.63) (0.57) (1.50)  (0.02) (0.90)  
Business  age  0.159 0.186  0.134 0.130 0.161 0.200  0.131 0.155  
   (10.12)**  (9.06)**  (5.07)**  (6.43)** (6.90)** (6.58)**  (3.41)** (4.93)**  
High FDI state  -0.482  -0.672       -0.478  -0.653       
   (9.59)**  (10.23)**     (6.25)**  (6.59)**       
Low FDI state  -0.533  -0.671       -0.561  -0.697       
   (10.30)**  (9.90)**       (6.99)**  (6.70)**       
Selectivity  term(1,2)  -1.241 -1.389  -0.037     -0.245 -0.184  -0.007    
   (1.17)  (1.00)  (0.54)     (0.50)  (0.28)  (0.20)     
Selectivity  term(1,3)  0.972 1.142  0.102     0.134 0.103  0.011    
   (1.30)  (1.17)  (1.47)     (0.39)  (0.22)  (0.33)     
Selectivity  term  (3,1)  -0.748 -0.737    0.111  -0.260 -0.164    0.027   
    (0.85) (0.64)    (1.20) (0.64) (0.30)    (0.72)  
Selectivity  term  (3,2)  1.072  1.158   -0.126  0.266  0.178   -0.057   
    (0.99) (0.81)    (1.75) (0.53) (0.26)    (1.91)  
Constant  -23.909 -17.558  -25.590 -12.852 -24.612 -20.259  -25.676 -13.967  
   (9.17)**  (5.14)**  (4.54)**  (4.40)** (5.87)** (3.72)**  (2.90)** (2.82)**  
Industry  dummies?  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Yer  dummies?  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Observations  3440 3440  1322 1525 3440 3440  1322 1525  
Establishments           1427  1427  555  604   
R-squared 0.60  0.32  0.62  0.64  0.6  0.31  0.6  0.62   
Rho              0.89  0.88  0.87  0.92   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses                 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%                  48 
 
                                            Table 9  Correction for selectivity bias in TFP equation: correction via reduced form estimation 
  Dependent variable Log TFP (adjusted for skills)      
      Conditional logit selection           Multinomial logit selection 
               OLS              Random effects (GLS)               OLS 
Random effects 
(GLS) 
    (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) 
Adjustment for market                         
power  1.869     1.525   1.526 1.519 1.845     1.545  
    (49.69)**     (51.51)**   (51.46)** (51.22)** (51.22)**     (50.92)**  
Foreign  market  access  -0.090 -0.115  -0.080 -0.099    -0.063 -0.081 -0.105 -0.076 -0.095 
    (7.56)**  (7.39)** (4.35)**  (4.13)**   (3.64)** (7.06)** (6.87)** (4.27)** (4.03)** 
Domestic  market  access  1.697 1.738  1.709 1.771    0.240 1.625 1.610 1.748 1.828 
    (4.41)** (3.44)**  (2.74)** (2.19)*   (0.41)  (4.36)** (3.24)** (2.89)** (2.28)* 
Own industry local size  0.216  0.445  0.388  0.600    0.645  -0.001  0.210  0.284  0.465 
    (1.38) (2.17)*  (1.59) (1.89)    (2.74)**  (0.01) (1.06) (1.21) (1.50) 
 Constrained by labor regulation 
(%)  -0.032 -0.046  -0.039 -0.053  -0.009     -0.041 -0.055 -0.043 -0.056 
    (3.27)** (3.63)**  (2.44)*  (2.57)* (0.63)      (4.47)** (4.48)** (2.85)** (2.81)** 
Output lost to power outage (%)  -0.232  -0.133  -0.219  -0.145  -0.243     -0.104  0.007  -0.170  -0.089 
    (7.83)** (3.43)**  (4.83)** (2.47)* (6.04)**     (3.53)** (0.18)  (3.87)** (1.53) 
Business  age  0.153 0.182  0.154 0.194  0.160 0.159 0.093 0.105 0.120 0.151 
    (9.64)**  (8.75)** (6.55)**  (6.32)** (6.74)** (6.70)** (5.38)** (4.58)** (5.04)** (4.80)** 
Estimated  Pr(High  FDI)  -0.099 -0.048  -0.066 -0.080  -0.077 -0.075 -3.021 -3.801 -1.172 -1.448 
    (0.87)  (1.04) (2.07)* (1.11) (2.09)* (1.18)  (9.60)**  (9.07)**  (4.59)** (4.26)** 
Estimated  Pr(Low  FDI)  -0.159 -0.108  -0.077 -0.058  -0.064 -0.063 -2.410 -2.798 -0.791 -0.947 
    (2.00)* (0.32) (1.24)  (1.16) (1.20)  (2.03)* (13.20)**  (11.50)**  (5.32)** (4.79)** 
Constant  -17.585 -9.817 -16.867 -10.846  -3.620  -8.429  -14.064 -5.420  -16.069 -9.739 
   (6.93)**  (2.95)**  (4.11)**  (2.03)*  (19.59)** (2.17)*  (5.70)**  (1.65)  (4.03)**  (1.84) 
Industry  dummies?  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yer  dummies?  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  3440 3440  3440 3440  3440 3440 3440 3440 3440 3440 
Establishments        1427 1427  1427 1427       1427 1427 
R-squared  0.59 0.29  0.58 0.30  0.57 0.57 0.62 0.32 0.61 0.32 
Rho        0.89 0.88  0.89 0.89       0.87 0.87 
Hausman-wu  test:                   
           df        15  14  12  13         
         chisquare         44.71  42.53  25.16  76.61             
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses                   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%                   
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